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This paper studies the eﬀects that heterogeneous multiple bank ﬁnancing has
on a ﬁrm’s risk- and information-policy, particularly with respect to credit rene-
gotiation eﬃciency. We ﬁnd that a signiﬁcant, yet limited, degree of relationship
lending enables ﬁrms with high asset speciﬁcity to credibly signal their desire to
abstain from strategic default. This allows the ﬁrm’s policy to eliminate the risk
of ineﬃcient liquidation even in the case of bleak cash-ﬂow expectations. This
“hold-up beneﬁt” comes at a cost, though: ﬁrms with low asset speciﬁcity cannot
always eliminate the risk of coordination failure by their banks. (JEL: D82, G21,
L14)
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11 Introduction
Multiple bank ﬁnancing is a widespread phenomenon, both among small and large ﬁrms.
Most often, ﬁrms do not obtain equal ﬁnancing shares from the banks but tend to bor-
row more from one relationship lender and smaller amounts from multiple arm’s-length
lenders (Ongena et al. [2000, 2008]). Among the beneﬁts of relationship lending,
more eﬃcient credit decisions for borrowers facing ﬁnancial distress are typically em-
phasized (Sharpe [1990]). Yet, the hold-up costs associated with a relationship bank’s
informational advantage and the ensuing rent extraction may be suﬃciently severe to
make additional borrowing from several, more distant “transactional” lenders attrac-
tive (Detragiache et al. [2000]). By complicating the reﬁnancing process, multiple
arm’s-length lending moreover hardens the ﬁrm’s budget constraints and reduces en-
trepreneurial incentives to default strategically (Dewatripont and Maskin [1995]).
At the same time, however, it suﬀers from the problem that ﬁnancially distressed but
fundamentally solvent ﬁrms may be forced into ineﬃcient default due to a coordination
failure among arm’s-length banks (Morris and Shin [2004]).
Recent work on the subject of heterogeneous multiple bank ﬁnancing has focussed
mainly on the ﬁrm’s choice of lending structure and on the eﬀects of lenders’ reﬁnancing
decisions on eﬃciency (e.g., Elsas et al. [2004]; Schuele and Stadler [2005]).
However, these papers mostly do not analyze the debtor ﬁrm’s investment strategy and
treat several parameters in the bank-ﬁrm relationships as exogenous. In particular, the
ﬁrm’s risk-taking and choice of transparency vis-` a-vis its lenders have hardly been taken
into account explicitly. The current paper tries to ﬁll this gap and emphasizes exactly
these strategic policy decisions by the debtor ﬁrm. The paper hence contributes to
the literature by (i) deriving a ﬁrm’s optimal choice of transparency and business risk
within a setting of asymmetric bank ﬁnancing and by (ii) studying how the optimal
policy and ﬁnancing regime interact.
In our model, the ﬁrm’s policy choice balances the relationship bank’s potential to
coordinate arm’s-length banks’ reﬁnancing decisions against the hold-up costs that arise
2from relationship lending, in order to reduce the incidence of ineﬃcient ﬁrm liquidation.
The optimal policy parameters crucially depend on the ﬁrm’s liquidation value and its
cash-ﬂow expectations, as these variables determine the strategic incentives of banks
and ﬁrm: the higher the liquidation value - for instance due to low asset speciﬁcity -
the more attractive it is for banks not to roll over credit, and the lower the expected
cash-ﬂows, the higher is the ﬁrm’s incentive to default strategically.
As one of the key insights, the model shows that heterogeneous multiple bank ﬁ-
nancing enables ﬁrms to choose a multi-faceted policy mix. While the degree of hetero-
geneity does not impact the ﬁrm’s optimal policy in the most favorable and the most
unfavorable circumstances for eﬃcient project continuation, it is decisive for the inter-
mediate cases. Particularly ﬁrms with highly-speciﬁc assets may fully eliminate the risk
of ineﬃcient liquidation, provided that the degree of relationship lending is limited.
If this is the case, the hold-up concern turns into a beneﬁt, as it allows the ﬁrm to
credibly signal to abstain from strategic default even for low cash-ﬂow expectations:
reﬁnancing relationship credit cannot become too costly, while the risk of coordination
failure among arm’s-length banks is nevertheless bounded. Still, this beneﬁcial eﬀect
comes at a cost: ﬁrms with lowly-speciﬁc assets suﬀer from a higher risk of ineﬃcient
liquidation unless expected cash-ﬂows are extremely high.
This result may contribute to an explanation of why particularly small and medium-
sized ﬁrms, which tend to be specialized in one or only a small number of production
lines that typically employ highly speciﬁc assets,1 enjoy the services of several banks of
which one - the so-called housebank - most often has a signiﬁcant but not overwhelming
status (Guiso and Minetti [2004, 2007]). For these ﬁrms, heterogeneous multiple
bank ﬁnancing reduces the incidence of ineﬃcient liquidation and, consequently, in-
creases the access to ﬁnance, a result that has been emphasized in several empirical
studies (Foglia et al. [1998]; Elsas and Krahnen [1998]).
1Dietsch and Petey (2004) show, for instance, that French and German small and medium-sized
enterprises have a lower asset correlation than large businesses. Lehmann et al. (2004) conclude
that smaller companies tend to be involved in innovative and often regional businesses.
3Overall, we can show that, except for the most unfavorable circumstances where
ﬁrms optimally “gamble for resurrection”, a heterogeneous multiple bank ﬁnancing
regime clearly moderates ﬁrms’ risk appetite or even eliminates it completely. In this
respect, asymmetric bank ﬁnancing proves to support economic stability by reducing
ﬁrms’ risk taking. At the same time, it induces ﬁrms to disclose very precise information
to their main lender, which contributes to overall transparency as well.
The main contribution of this paper lies in uncovering the “ﬂip-side” of the hold-
up problem that arises once informed relationship bank ﬁnancing coexists with less-
informed arm’s-length bank ﬁnancing. It delivers an instrument for the ﬁrm to commit
to eﬃcient continuation of the business project and to abstain from strategic default
even for bleak business prospects. This is in contrast to Bolton and Scharfstein
[1996], where a multiplicity of homogeneous lenders reduces the ﬁrm’s incentive to
default strategically, while in our model the hold-up “beneﬁt” necessarily requires a
signiﬁcant, albeit limited degree of relationship banking stemming from the coexistence
of relationship and arm’s-length banking.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview
on related literature. Section 3 delineates the model of heterogeneous multiple bank
ﬁnancing. Section 4 derives the equilibrium structure, while the subsequent section
analyzes optimal risk-taking and information disclosure for a ﬁrm that aims at reducing
ineﬃcient project liquidation. Section 6 studies the interaction of optimal policy choice
and ﬁnancing regime and section 7 concludes.
2 Related literature
Seminal papers on bank ﬁnancing focussed on the diﬀerences between single relationship
lending on the one hand and multiple arm’s-length lending on the other. According to
Fischer [1990], Boot [2000], and Elsas [2005], relationship banking is characterized
by long-term relations between bank and customer, a large proportion of total ﬁrm debt
held by the relationship bank, and preferred access to ﬁrm-speciﬁc information through
4multiple interactions. As the ongoing sharing of information between borrower and
lending bank strengthens the relationship, commitment between the two parties allows
for intertemporal transfers: the bank may reasonably expect to earn high rents in the
future, so that she may be willing to accept low proﬁts (or even losses by forgiving debt,
reducing interest rates etc.) in ﬁnancial distress situations (Petersen and Rajan
[1995]; Allen and Gale [1999]). However, due to the information monopoly of the
relationship lender, a hold-up problem may arise: a borrower’s trial to raise debt capital
from alternative sources tends to be interpreted as a negative signal about his credit-
worthiness by these outside lenders and is, hence, accompanied by a high risk premium.
Anticipating this eﬀect, the incumbent relationship lender may extract a substantial
monopoly rent (Sharpe [1990]; Rajan [1992]). In our model, the relationship bank’s
potential to hold-up a borrower becomes manifest in the reﬁnancing costs that jump
up once relationship debt is not prolonged.
Multiple arm’s-length lending avoids the risk of capture by a single housebank (Von
Thadden [1992]).2 It also helps to mitigate managerial incentive problems by making
reﬁnancing decisions more complicated. In this context, Dewatripont and Maskin
[1995] argue that a relationship bank may not be able to credibly commit to stop re-
ﬁnancing unproﬁtable projects and thus reduces entrepreneurial incentives to prevent
default by softening the ﬁrm’s budget constraints.3 Bolton and Scharfstein [1996],
in contrast, show how complicated credit renegotiations among several creditors may
limit debtor ﬁrms’ incentives to default strategically.4 While, according to Detra-
2As an alternative in order to reduce the hold-up problem from relationship bank ﬁnancing, rather
than changing the ﬁnancing system, Mahrt-Smith (2006) also suggests to let the bank hold a small
equity stake in the ﬁrm. This reduces the bank’s ability to extract rents in multiple rounds of ﬁnancing
and has been common in the German banking system, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s.
3For an overview on the theory of soft budget constraints, see Kornai et al. [2003].
4Strategic default refers to a debtor’s incentive not to repay the full amount of credit in order
to force lenders to forgive (part of the) debt (Bolton and Scharfstein [1990]; Mella-Barral
[1999]). In contrast to Bolton and Scharfstein [1996], Bergloef et al. [2008] prove that
imperfect renegotiation may also lead to increasing incentives to default strategically along with a
larger number of creditors.
5giache et al. [2000] multiple arm’s-length bank ﬁnancing may moreover help to
overcome liquidity shortages of a single lender and hence reduces the probability of an
early liquidation of the debtor ﬁrm, coordination failures among several arm’s-length
banks may lead to the opposite eﬀect (Morris and Shin [2004]). In this respect,
fear of premature credit foreclosure by other lenders may lead to pre-emptive actions
by individual lenders that undermine the sustainability of the debtor ﬁrm. Similarly
to the coordination problem among bank depositors in Diamond and Dybvig [1983]
and Goldstein and Pauzner [2005], Morris and Shin [2004] show that this pre-
emptive action may force inherently solvent but illiquid companies into an ineﬃcient
default. Our paper stresses both coordination eﬀects and the mitigation of adverse
managerial incentives as the key features of multiple arm’s-length banking.
Recent empirical studies show that the combination of single relationship banking
with multiple arm’s-length banking is frequently observed in reality, both among small
and large companies. According to Houston and James [1996], more than 60 percent
of listed ﬁrms in the U.S. have multiple heterogeneous bank relationships. Guiso
and Minetti [2007] conclude from the 1993 and 1998 U.S. National Survey of Small
Business Finance that among ﬁrms with two lenders, one bank provides approximately
77 per cent of total credit, for ﬁrms with three lenders, the largest ﬁnancing share is
65 per cent. Concentrated borrowing is also prevalent in other countries with strong
ﬁrm-bank relationships such as Germany, Japan or Italy.5
Heterogeneous bank ﬁnancing is also found in a slightly diﬀerent context in the
form of loan syndication, i.e. a loan issued to a ﬁrm jointly by at least two ﬁnancial
institutions. In a sample of syndicated loans to U.S. nonﬁnancial ﬁrms between 1992 and
5Ongena and Smith [2000] conclude from a sample of 1129 large ﬁrms from 20 European countries
that less than 15% of the ﬁrms maintain single-bank relationships while more than 20% use eight banks
or more. Machauer and Weber [2001] and Elsas [2005] show that for German ﬁrms the number
of bank relationships increases in ﬁrm size but decreases with the existence of a housebank. For
medium-sized German ﬁrms, Brunner and Krahnen [2008] ﬁnd an average of 6 (heterogeneous)
bank relationships.
62003, Sufi [2007] ﬁnds an average of 8.1 syndicate lenders. Usually, one lead arranger
establishes the relationship with the borrower, collects participant lenders to fund part
of the loan and monitors the ﬁrm over the life of the loan. Comparable to a relationship
bank, the lead arranger typically obtains conﬁdential information about the borrowing
ﬁrm and holds a larger share of the loan than the participant lenders. Interestingly,
the particular syndicate structure (i.e. degree of concentration of lenders, amount of
loan syndicated etc.) is signiﬁcantly correlated with the transparency of the borrowing
ﬁrm (Dennis and Mullineaux [2000]; Lee and Mullineaux [2004]; Sufi [2007]),
the ﬁrm’s default probability and liquidation value (Jones et al. [2005]). While not
catered to this particular instance of heterogeneous multiple bank ﬁnancing, our results
may - at least partly - be applied to this framework as well.
Recent theoretical work on heterogeneous multiple bank ﬁnancing by Hubert and
Schaefer [2002], Elsas et al. [2004], Janda [2006], Egli et al. [2006] and
Bannier [2007] has mainly focussed on the optimal structure (or concentration) of
bank debt. Hubert and Schaefer [2002] contrast renegotiation eﬃciency in a sin-
gle relationship lending regime with the eﬃciency obtained from multiple arm’s-length
banking. They ﬁnd that the negative eﬀects from coordination failure among trans-
action banks may exceed the hold-up costs from relationship banking if information
asymmetries between debtor ﬁrm and banks are not too strong. Elsas et al. [2004]
derive the optimal debt structure directly from the trade-oﬀ between the bargaining
power of the relationship bank and the risk of coordination failure from arm’s-length
banks. They ﬁnd that ﬁrms with high expected cash-ﬂows prefer a homogeneous mul-
tiple bank ﬁnancing regime without a relationship bank, while ﬁrms with low expected
proﬁts or high asset speciﬁcity tend to be ﬁnanced within a heterogeneous multiple
banking system. Janda [2006] derives heterogeneous multiple bank ﬁnancing as the
optimal ﬁnancing regime that leads to renegotiation proofness in a costly state veri-
ﬁcation framework. Egli et al. [2006] show that the choice of ﬁnancing regime is
dependent on the likelihood of strategic default: in an environment where strategic de-
faults are likely, ﬁrms choose relationship banking over arm’s-length lending. Bannier
7[2007] complements the earlier work by Hubert and Schaefer [2002] by comparing
the eﬃciency eﬀects of a heterogeneous multiple banking regime to the isolated regimes
of single relationship banking and multiple arm’s-length lending, respectively.
In-depth analyses of reﬁnancing eﬃciency with respect to agents’ characteristics
have recently sprung up from the theory of global games, introduced by Carlsson
and Van Damme [1993] and generalized by Morris and Shin [2003]. Bannier
[2005] analyzes the eﬀects that large and small speculators’ short-selling decisions may
have on the likelihood of currency crises. Focussing on credit renegotiation, Takeda
[2003] and Schuele and Stadler [2005] examine how the amount of relationship
lending and the housebank’s information advantage vis-` a-vis the arm’s-length banks
may help to reduce the incidence of coordination failure. Schuele [2007] analyzes the
relationship bank’s signalling ability and its eﬀects on the debtor ﬁrm’s soft budget
constraints.
A ﬁrm’s choice of risk- and information-policy as the consequence of a particular ﬁ-
nancing regime has rarely been analyzed before. As one of the ﬁrst studies, Heinemann
and Metz (2002) examined the optimal policy-mix for a ﬁrm that aims at minimizing
the probability of a liquidity crisis following early withdrawal of credit by a continuum
of homogeneous lenders. Bannier and Heinemann [2005] analyze a similar question
with respect to a central bank’s policy choice in order to avoid currency crises. Due
to the simple frameworks, both papers arrive at clear-cut recommendations regarding
the optimal policy choice. The current paper extends this earlier work in two ways.
First, it assumes a richer (asymmetric) structure of creditor types, thereby allowing for
various strategic incentives to aﬀect the policy choice. Second, whereas the paper by
Heinemann and Metz (2002) was limited to ﬁrms with high liquidation value, the
current study considers both ﬁrms with high and low liquidation value. In contrast
to the papers by Bester (1985), Besanko and Thakor (1987) or Chen (2006),
however, the liquidation value is no strategic choice variable to the ﬁrms. Rather, this
paper is related to the work by Diamond (1991) where the eﬀect of debt structures on
the eﬃciency of liquidation decisions is analyzed.
83 The model
We consider a simple model where a ﬁrm is ﬁnanced by a relationship bank and a
continuum of arm’s-length banks.6 The ﬁrm runs a project with stochastic return θ
that matures within two time periods. The ﬁrm has promised to repay the banks an
amount of r(> 0) per unit of credit if the project succeeds in the second period. If it
fails, the ﬁrm will go into bankruptcy and repayment will be zero. However, lenders
may withdraw their loans after the ﬁrst period, so that the project is threatened by
early liquidation. Premature withdrawal yields a liquidation value of K(< r) per unit
of credit. All agents are assumed to be risk-neutral.
The bank ﬁnancing system is heterogeneous in three respects. First, the relationship
bank is a large lender, i.e. she ﬁnances a proportion λ ∈ [0,1] of the total amount of
debt, while the arm’s-length banks are small lenders in that their individual investment
is negligible. The combined mass of loans provided by the small banks amounts to
(1 − λ), however. Parameter λ may hence be seen as characterizing the degree of
heterogeneity of the ﬁnancing regime.7
Second, it is assumed that the relationship bank has been having long-term relations
with the ﬁrm, so that she receives more precise information about the project than any
of the arm’s-length banks. More speciﬁcally, it is assumed that the relationship bank
obtains a private signal, xR, about project quality θ, with xR|θ ∼ N(θ, 1
c). Small banks
observe individual private signals xS|θ ∼ N(θ, 1
b) with b ≤ c.8 Hence, any arm’s-length
banks’ private information is at most as precise as the relationship bank’s signal. Noise
in private signals is mutually independent and independent of θ. The distributions of
6The assumption of a continuum of arm’s-length banks is made for simplicity. It can be shown
that considering a ﬁnite number of banks instead does not qualitatively impair the results. See also
Morris and Shin [2003].
7For the extreme cases of λ = 1 and λ = 0, the model considers single relationship banking and
homogeneous multiple banking, respectively.
8As will be explained below, b is an exogenous parameter in the model whereas c is a choice variable
for the ﬁrm.
9private signals are common knowledge.
Third, due to the informational advantage of the relationship bank it is assumed
that it is more costly for the ﬁrm to reﬁnance credit withdrawn by the relationship
bank (at costs of WR per unit of capital) than to reﬁnance credit withdrawn by any
of the arm’s-length banks (at costs of WS), i.e. WR > WS. This mirrors the typical
hold-up problem, indicating that, over the course of the relationship, it gets ever more
diﬃcult for the debtor to set up a new ﬁnancing with an outside lender. However,
reﬁnancing informed capital must not become ineﬃciently costly; therefore, we assume
that WR ≤ 1 + r. Altogether, it holds that 0 ≤ r < WS < WR ≤ 1 + r.
The complete sequence of moves in this game is as follows:
1. In t = 0, the ﬁrm sets up the project. It commits to providing the relationship
bank with information of precision c and chooses a level of operating risk that
leads to a variance of project cash-ﬂow of 1/a in order to maximize its expected
payoﬀ. The chosen policy parameters become common knowledge for the banks.
2. In t = 0+, nature chooses project quality θ from the commonly known distribution
θ ∼ N(y,1/a). The realized value of θ is observed by the ﬁrm’s managers but
remains unobservable to bank lenders. Nature disseminates signals xR and xS
about project quality to the banks.
3. In t = 1, banks decide whether to extend or withdraw their loans. Simultaneously,
the ﬁrm has to choose whether to commit to additional eﬀort V that is necessary
for successful completion of the project in t = 2, or to terminate the project
altogether. The decision to undertake additional eﬀort is tied to reﬁnancing the
withdrawn fraction of debt.
4. In t = 2, project cash-ﬂow is realized and equals θ if the ﬁrm did sink eﬀort and
reﬁnance. Banks then receive their repayment of r. Otherwise, the project fails
and credit cannot be repaid. The ﬁnal liquidation value of assets is assumed to
be zero.
10Note that in t = 1 banks and ﬁrm decide on their actions simultaneously. This
implies that the ﬁrm does not wait to observe the actual amount of ﬁnancial disruption,
but makes its decision based on the anticipated amount of capital withdrawn. Such
preemptive behavior may be reasonable for ﬁrms whose main business is at stake and
whose managers fear a depreciation of human capital should they be forced into default
after all. It may also be argued that closing down a ﬁrm when its capital is still
positive is less costly than closing down when it is bankrupt (Gilson et al. [1990];
Egli et al. [2006]).9 Section 4 will show that this assumption allows a straightforward
derivation of equilibrium. Fig. 1 portrays the sequence of moves in the model.
4 Equilibrium in the reﬁnancing stage
Before deriving the optimal ﬁrm policy in t = 0, we have to analyze the equilibrium
behavior of ﬁrm and banks in t = 1, that will - in turn - be inﬂuenced by the ﬁrm’s
policy choice. In order to do so, we follow the solution method by Morris and Shin
[2003, 2004] and Bannier [2005] for global games.10 As has been shown in these earlier
studies, a unique (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium in trigger strategies may be derived,
provided that private information about the uncertain payoﬀ (parameter θ in our case)
is suﬃciently precise. The equilibrium is characterized by the triple (x∗
R,x∗
S,θ∗). The
relationship bank will roll over credit whenever her private signal about project quality,
xR, is greater than the switching point x∗
R. Likewise, any small bank will prolong credit
if it observes a private signal xS larger than x∗
S. Correspondingly, the ﬁrm will decide to
continue the project if the realized project quality, θ, is greater than θ∗ and will default
early otherwise. In the following, we derive the conditions that jointly determine the
9According to Gilson et al. [1990] only few companies in ﬁnancial distress wait for a default to
happen due to illiquidity. Egli et al. [2006] relate this pre-emptive behavior to accounting standards,
the quality of law enforcement and legal protections for creditors.
10In a global game, each player noisily observes the game’s payoﬀ structure, i.e. cash-ﬂow parameter






investment and policy choice:
operating risk
transparency vis-` a-vis relationship bank
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ﬁrm chooses: strategic default / continue
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cash-ﬂow θ and repayment r if project continued
0 otherwise
ﬁrm chooses
t = 0+ nature realizes project quality θ
and disseminates private signals to banks
information stage:




Having received private information xR, the relationship bank updates her prior
beliefs. Given the bivariate normal distribution of θ and xR, her posterior belief about
project quality is characterized by an expected value11 of E(θ|xR) = a/(a+c)y+c/(a+
c)xR, which is the precision-weighted average of the face value of public information y
and her private signal xR, and a variance of Var(θ|xR) = 1/(a+c). Her expected payoﬀ
11When θ and x are bivariate normal, the conditional expectation is obtained as E(θ|x) = E(θ) +
Cov(θ,x)
V ar(x) (x − E(x)).
12from extending the loan is therefore given by
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where Φ(·) denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution. Consequently, the
critical signal x∗
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i.e. by indiﬀerence between extending and foreclosing the loan.
Likewise, indiﬀerence for any small bank is given at12
πS(withdraw|xS) = πS(extend|xS)
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so that x∗
S may implicitly be derived.
Having observed the realized project quality θ, the cutoﬀ condition for the ﬁrm -
deciding between continuing the project and terminating it early - is given by13
πF(eﬀort and reﬁnance|θ) = πF(terminate|θ)
θ − V − λr prob(xR ≥ x
∗
R|θ) − (1 − λ)r prob(xS ≥ x
∗
S|θ)
−λWR prob(xR < x
∗
R|θ) − (1 − λ)WS prob(xS < x
∗
S|θ) = 0 .
I.e., if the ﬁrm decides to continue the project, it will receive the project’s cash-ﬂow
net of eﬀort costs, credit repayments and reﬁnancing costs.
The following Lemma solves for the equilibrium switching values.
12Updating of beliefs follows the same routine as for the large bank and delivers the following
conditional distribution of project quality: θ|xS ∼ N(a/(a + b)y + b/(a + b)xS ,1/(a + b)).
13Note that due to the assumed independence of signals, the proportion of small banks withdrawing
their money is equivalent to the probability with which any single small bank observes a private signal
lower than x∗
S.













































































The equilibrium is unique provided that private information is suﬃciently precise rela-
tive to public information about θ.
Appendix A will outline the proof.
Note that with common knowledge (i.e. fully precise public information) about
θ, multiple equilibria would be obtained for V + r < θ < V + λWR + (1 − λ)WS.
Why? Assume that project cash-ﬂows were extremely low: θ < V + r. In this case,
the ﬁrm’s expected payoﬀ from continuing the project would be negative even in the
most favorable case where all banks decided to prolong credit and no reﬁnancing were
necessary, so that the costs from continuing the project were as low as V +r. Therefore,
the ﬁrm would certainly terminate the project, irrespective of the banks’ actions. For
very high project cash-ﬂows, θ > V +λWR+(1−λ)WS, in contrast, the expected payoﬀ
from continuing would be positive, even in the most unfavorable case where all banks
decided to withdraw early, resulting in extremely high continuation costs of V +λWR+
(1 − λ)WS. Hence, the ﬁrm would certainly continue, again irrespective of the banks’
actions. In-between these two threshold values, however, self-fulﬁlling expectations
among banks may lead to both continuation and termination being optimal.14 For
instance, if an individual small bank believes that suﬃciently many other banks will
14Strategic complementarities in this set-up make one action the more attractive the higher the
proportion of other banks that choose the same action.
14withdraw their money it is very likely that the ﬁrm - anticipating high reﬁnancing costs
- will terminate the project, which makes it optimal not to prolong credit in the ﬁrst
place, thereby vindicating the initial belief.
If project cash-ﬂow θ is not common knowledge, but instead banks observe private
signals about θ, a “grain of doubt” is put into this deliberation that eliminates the self-
fulﬁlling feature of agents’ beliefs.15 Hence, a unique equilibrium may be obtained that
assigns a uniquely optimal action for the banks to any signal value x and for the ﬁrm to
any project quality θ. This, in turn, allows to study in which way the ﬁrm’s policy will
inﬂuence behavior and equilibrium outcome by conducting comparative static analyses.
Throughout the rest of the paper, we will always assume that the banks’ private
information is suﬃciently precise so that a unique equilibrium exists. Furthermore,
we will focus on the case of intermediate project qualities, i.e. we assume that θ ∈
[V +r, V +λWR+(1−λ)WS], as this is the interesting interval to study: if the project
quality were below (above) this interval, the project would never (always) be continued,
irrespective of the ﬁrm’s policy. Note that within this interval, equilibrium may still
be ineﬃcient: the ﬁrm terminates the project whenever a project quality lower than θ∗
is realized; however, for all θ ∈ [V + r, θ∗], terminating the project is ineﬃcient since
the ﬁrm would be able to continue if only the expected proportion of debt withdrawn
prematurely were lower, a problem denoted as “coordination failure”. As a consequence,
the ﬁrm’s objective of maximizing its expected proﬁt by choosing appropriate policy
parameters coincides with minimizing the probability of ineﬃcient project liquidation:
a positive net-payoﬀ can only be achieved by the ﬁrm if the project is continued, which
becomes more likely, the lower threshold θ∗ can be pushed.
15Uncertainty about the realized cash-ﬂow value θ allows banks to assign probabilities (diﬀerent from
zero or one) to the proportion of banks who choose one action over the other and hence to calculate the
expected proﬁt from this action as a smooth function. If banks’ private signals are not too imprecise,
this process enables them to determine the exact point of indiﬀerence at which they should optimally
switch from one action to the other.
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The ﬁrm’s optimal policy aims at maximizing its expected payoﬀ by reducing the prob-








∗ − y))} s.t. equilibrium uniqueness,
with θ∗ given by (3). Note that the ﬁrm’s choice of parameters is restricted to ensure
uniqueness of equilibrium, i.e. there is a lower bound on the precision of information
to be disclosed to the relationship bank: c ≥ cmin.16
While the optimal policy should induce banks to choose the eﬃcient action and
prolong credit, the banks succumb to various types of incentives to deviate from ef-
ﬁciency. We will brieﬂy delineate these strategic deliberations in the following before
deriving the optimal policy parameters. First, note that it is the more attractive for
banks to withdraw their money early, the higher the liquidation value K is. Second,
the incentive not to prolong credit is also inﬂuenced by the banks’ anticipation of the
ﬁrm’s behavior. If the ﬁrm decides on a strategic default and terminates the project
prematurely, each bank would rather withdraw credit, which delivers a payment of K
as compared to the case of a zero payoﬀ if credit were prolonged. In contrast, if the
ﬁrm decides on project continuation, each bank would like to extend credit in order to
obtain the repayment of r (> K) after successful completion of the project rather than
foreclose early.
Yet, the ﬁrm’s behavior cannot be observed at the time banks have to make their
decisions. Still, they know that the ﬁrm is more likely to terminate the project prema-












. The mutual dependence of the two minimum
precision values mirrors the fact that each bank type’s information precision may make up for a lack
in precision of the other type’s information in order to insure uniqueness of equilibrium. Without
restricting our results, we may assume in the following that arm’s-length banks’ private information




2π(1−λ(WR−r)). It then follows that cmin = a
2
2π.
16turely the higher the costs from reﬁnancing the withdrawn parts of credit are relative
to the realizable project cash-ﬂow in t = 2. Unfortunately, both reﬁnancing costs and
realized project quality θ are not known by the banks and give rise to two diﬀerent types
of uncertainty. “Fundamental uncertainty” arises because banks cannot observe the re-
alized project quality. As, furthermore, banks cannot observe each others actions, there
is also “strategic uncertainty” about the resulting reﬁnancing costs for the ﬁrm. The
ﬁrm’s policy now determines both types of uncertainty. The higher the chosen business
risk, the larger is the project quality’s variance and the more diﬃcult is it for banks
to assess the unknown value of θ. Via the precision of private information disclosed
to the relationship bank, the ﬁrm inﬂuences strategic uncertainty among lenders. The
more precise the relationship bank’s private information becomes, the less weight will
the large bank attach to the common prior y in calculating the posterior expected value
of the project. This makes her action less predictable for the small banks and increases
strategic uncertainty unless business risk were so small that the realized project quality
θ were very close to its ex-ante expected value y. In this case, the relationship bank’s
private signal will also be very narrowly distributed around y, which reduces strategic
uncertainty.
Note that the relationship bank plays a prominent role in arm’s-length banks’ de-
liberations about their optimal behavior. First, since it is more expensive for the ﬁrm
to reﬁnance credit withdrawn by the relationship bank, this bank has a much stronger
inﬂuence on the ﬁrm’s decision of whether or not to terminate the project early, i.e.
default strategically. Because, second, the relationship bank moves a signiﬁcant pro-
portion of total ﬁrm debt by her decisions, it is very important for arm’s-length banks
to anticipate her behavior as precisely as possible. On the other hand, the relationship
bank’s decision can be directly inﬂuenced by the ﬁrm via the disclosure of information.
Arm’s-length banks behavior, in contrast, cannot be directly inﬂuenced. This latter
eﬀect is strengthened by the fact that arm’s-length banks’ strategic choices succumb to
aggregate uncertainty, while the relationship bank moves a ﬁxed part of total ﬁrm debt
by her decision.
17In the following, we will derive the optimal precision of information to be disclosed
to the relationship bank ﬁrst. Then, based on the results for optimal information policy,
we will in a second step establish the optimal business risk to be chosen.
5.1 Optimal information disclosure
The directional impact of information precision c on the probability of ineﬃcient project













where ϕ(·) denotes the standard normal distribution function.
∂θ∗/∂c > 0 whenever17
(6) θ










For θ∗ larger than threshold function M(·), in contrast, trigger value θ∗ decreases in c.
For inﬁnitely precise information, i.e. c → ∞, threshold function M(·) converges to y.
Convergence is from above for K < 1/2r and from below for K > 1/2r. Equilibrium
value θ∗, in contrast, converges to
θ






















In ﬁnding the optimal policy parameter c∗, we therefore have to diﬀerentiate between
the cases of a low early liquidation value, K < 1/2r, and a high early liquidation value,
K > 1/2r, with the two subcases of low expected cash-ﬂow, y < θc, and high expected
cash-ﬂow, y > θc. A detailed derivation of results will be given in appendix C.
The following proposition sums up the results with regard to optimal information
disclosure to the relationship bank:
Proposition 1 For given riskiness 1/a, optimal information disclosure requires providing
the relationship bank with information of precision as given in Tab. 1. Here, cmin = a2
2π,
17Appendix B will derive this result.
18Table 1: Optimal information precision, c∗
K > 1/2r K < 1/2r
low expected c∗ → ∞ c∗ = cmin for a ≤ ¯ a
cash-ﬂow y c∗ → ∞ for a > ¯ a
high expected c∗ = cmin for ˜ c < cmin c∗ = cmin
cash-ﬂow y c∗ = ˜ c for ˜ c ≥ cmin
˜ c is implicitly deﬁned by θ∗(˜ c) = y − 1/
√
a + ˜ c Φ−1(K/r) and ¯ a by equality of θ∗(cmin)
and θc.
For projects with high expected cash-ﬂows, the ﬁrm optimally provides the relation-
ship bank with information of relatively low precision. This reduces the weight that
the relationship bank attaches to her private signal in her posterior belief about project
quality θ. Hence, the bank will rely more on publicly available information, i.e. the
ex-ante expected cash-ﬂow y, so that her posterior expectation about θ remains high.
At the same time, strategic uncertainty’ among banks is reduced because each arm’s-
length bank knows that the relationship bank will place more weight on the common
part y in calculating posterior beliefs. For low expected cash-ﬂow, in contrast, the ﬁrm
tends to disclose more precise information, so that the relationship bank is induced to
neglect the bad ex-ante expected value y. However, if business risk (1/a) is relatively
high, fundamental uncertainty about project quality is already suﬃciently high, so that
the need to further distract the bank from a low value of y is not that urgent and
disclosing information of minimal precision is adequate to this end.
Note that in the upper left cell in Tab. 1 (high K and low y), banks experience the
highest incentive to foreclose their loans early. This is due to the fact that they expect
a relatively high payment of K (while still lower than r) in this case and anticipate that
the ﬁrm will tolerate only relatively low reﬁnancing costs before opting for a strategic
default. In the lower right cell (low K and high y) the opposite holds. Here, it is most
attractive for banks to prolong credit. Clearly, the latter case is the most favorable
19for the desired continuation of the project for the ﬁrm. Interestingly, both cases are
characterized by clear-cut results concerning the choice of optimal information precision.
In the two remaining cases, in contrast, optimal information disclosure is dependent on
the chosen business risk. The next section will therefore examine the optimal degree
of riskiness 1/a that the ﬁrm should choose for its project, given that it has already
decided on the optimal precision of information to be disclosed to the relationship bank.
5.2 Optimal risk-taking
In contrast to information precision c, risk parameter a inﬂuences the probability of






















In order to minimize the probability of ineﬃcient project liquidation, the ﬁrm not only
has to be concerned with the impact of a on θ∗, but also with the diﬀerence between
θ∗ and the expected cash-ﬂow y.18 As has already been stated above, the derivation
of the ﬁrm’s optimal risk policy is based on the optimal information disclosure results.
We therefore again have to consider diﬀerent cases regarding the value of K and the
expected cash-ﬂow y. A detailed derivation of results is given in appendix D.
The following proposition combines the results with respect to optimal risk-taking
and information disclosure.
Proposition 2 Optimal risk-taking and information disclosure depend on the ratio of the
project’s liquidation value K to repayment r and on the expected cash-ﬂow y. The opti-
mal policy-mix is contingent on the degree of heterogeneity in bank ﬁnancing, whenever
exogenous circumstances are neither too favorable nor too unfavorable for successful
completion of the ﬁrm’s project. A detailed account of results is presented in Tab. 2.
18In the following, the “double star” (a∗∗) indicates that this value of a takes account of both aspects
and hence minimizes the overall probability of ineﬃcient project liquidation.
20Table 2: Results regarding optimal information precision, c∗, and business risk, 1/a∗∗
K > 1/2r K < 1/2r
λ > ¯ λ : c∗ = cmin, a∗∗ = 0
low expected c∗ → ∞, a∗∗ = 0 ⇒ prob(θ ≤ θ∗) = 1/2
cash-ﬂow, ⇒ prob(θ ≤ θ∗) = 1/2
y < θc λ ≤ ¯ λ : c∗ = cmin, a∗∗ → ∞
⇒ prob(θ ≤ θ∗) = 0
λ > ¯ λ : c∗ = cmin, a∗∗ → ∞
⇒ prob(θ ≤ θ∗) = 0
high expected λ ≤ ¯ λ and y < θ∗(cmin,a → ∞) : c∗ = cmin, a∗∗ → ∞
cash-ﬂow, c∗ = ˜ c, a∗∗ = ˜ a ⇒ prob(θ ≤ θ∗) = 0
y > θc ⇒ 0 < prob(θ ≤ θ∗) ≤ 1/2
λ ≤ ¯ λ and y > θ∗(cmin,a → ∞) :
c∗ = cmin, a∗∗ → ∞
⇒ prob(θ ≤ θ∗) = 0
5.3 Interpretation of results
Starting with the most unfavorable case for eﬃcient project continuation in the upper
left cell (high K and low y) in Tab. 2, we ﬁnd that optimal ﬁrm policy maximizes
both fundamental and strategic uncertainty by choosing maximum business risk and
disclosing maximally precise information to the relationship bank. By doing so, the ﬁrm
“gambles for resurrection” and is able to reduce the probability of ineﬃcient project
21liquidation to a level of 1/2, which is the best that can be achieved in this case. Since
banks have a high incentive to foreclose their credit early due to the high liquidation
value K and to the low anticipated tolerance with regard to the ﬁrm’s reﬁnancing costs,
the best the ﬁrm can do is to create a maximum of uncertainty both with respect to the
underlying project quality θ and with respect to aggregate ﬁnancial disruption. Note
that optimal ﬁrm policy is completely independent of the structure of bank debt, i.e.
of heterogeneity parameter λ.
In the opposite case (lower right cell), where a ﬁrm with highly-speciﬁc assets (low
liquidation value K) runs a project with high expected cash-ﬂow, it faces only a low
risk of coordination failure among banks. Banks have only a low ex-ante incentive to
withdraw their money early. Additionally, they anticipate only a low propensity of the
ﬁrm towards a strategic default. Optimal ﬁrm policy is then given by minimum business
risk and a disclosure of minimally precise information to the relationship bank. The
subsequent minimization of both fundamental and strategic uncertainty fully eliminates
the remaining risk of ineﬃcient credit withdrawal among banks and hence of ineﬃcient
project liquidation. Again, the degree of heterogeneity in the bank ﬁnancing system is
not decisive for optimal ﬁrm policy.
In the remaining two cases, in contrast, the degree of heterogeneity in bank debt
plays a crucial role for optimal ﬁrm policy. If a ﬁrm with highly-speciﬁc assets conducts
a project with low expected cash-ﬂow (low K and y, upper right cell), we ﬁnd that it
can reduce the probability of ineﬃcient project liquidation to a level of only .5, if the
degree of relationship banking is relatively high. In order to do so, the ﬁrm has to resort
to a maximum of business risk and to disclosing minimally precise information to the
relationship bank. Note that in contrast to the situation in the upper left cell, however,
the banks’ ex-ante incentive to decide on premature credit withdrawal is less urgent, as
the early liquidation payment K is much lower. Still, due to the low expected cash-ﬂow
y, banks anticipate only a low threshold of reﬁnancing costs to be tolerated by the ﬁrm
before resorting to a strategic default.
If, however, relationship lending in this situation is bounded above by the amount
22of arm’s-length ﬁnancing, i.e. if λ ≤ ¯ λ, the optimal ﬁrm policy is able to fully eliminate
the remaining coordination risk among banks and hence to reduce the probability of
ineﬃcient project liquidation to a value of zero. Why is this possible despite the low
expected project cash-ﬂow and why is it important that the degree of relationship
banking is bounded above? Remember that it is more costly (per unit of capital)
for the ﬁrm to reﬁnance relationship credit than reﬁnancing arm’s-length credit, i.e.
WR > WS. Hence, whenever the degree of relationship bank ﬁnancing is limited, the
maximum level of reﬁnancing costs is limited as well. It may therefore be worthwhile
for the ﬁrm to continue the project despite the low expected project cash-ﬂow. In any
way, the ﬁrm can use the limited degree of relationship banking as a credible signal that
it will abstain from a strategic default, despite the low value of y. This reduces the ex-
ante risk of coordination failure among banks and allows the ﬁrm’s policy to eliminate
it completely and, thus, to reduce the probability of ineﬃcient project liquidation to
a value of zero. All the ﬁrm has to do is to choose minimum business risk and to
disclose maximally precise information to the relationship bank,19 thereby minimizing
fundamental and strategic uncertainty.
In the remaining case (lower left cell), the ﬁrm faces a relatively high ex-ante in-
centive of early foreclosure by her banks due to the high liquidation value K. With
sound cash-ﬂow expectations (high y), however, banks anticipate a high tolerance of
the ﬁrm with regard to reﬁnancing costs. This reduces their incentive to withdraw
credit early. If in this instance, the ﬁrm makes use of a high degree of relationship
banking (λ > ¯ λ), this leaves a large amount of credit that can directly be inﬂuenced
by the ﬁrm’s information policy and only a small amount of credit that succumbs to
an uncontrolled risk of coordination failure (among arm’s-length banks). A high degree
of relationship ﬁnancing therefore allows to completely eliminate the remaining prob-
ability of ineﬃcient project liquidation by choosing zero business risk and disclosing
fully precise information to the relationship bank. By doing so, both fundamental and
19Note that information precision of cmin combined with a risk parameter of a → ∞ implies inﬁnitely
high precision: cmin → ∞.
23strategic uncertainty are minimized.
Yet, if the degree of relationship bank ﬁnancing is relatively low, a high remain-
ing fraction of total ﬁrm debt succumbs to aggregate uncertainty among arm’s-length
banks and hence to the risk of coordination failure that is less easily resolved by the
ﬁrm’s optimal policy. In this case, the ﬁrm is able to fully eliminate the probability of
ineﬃcient project liquidation only if the expected project cash-ﬂow is extremely high.
If this condition is satisﬁed, arm’s-length banks will have a high incentive to prolong
credit as they anticipate that the ﬁrm will tolerate almost any level of reﬁnancing costs
without resorting to a strategic default. Despite the high oﬀered payment of K in case
of early withdrawal, banks will then rather target the full repayment of credit r at the
end of the project’s maturity and prolong credit. However, if expected cash-ﬂow y takes
on only moderate values (without being classiﬁed as “low”, which would lead to the
upper left cell), optimal ﬁrm policy is not able to fully eliminate the risk of coordination
failure. By choosing intermediate values of business risk and information precision the
ﬁrm can reduce the probability of ineﬃcient project liquidation only to a level between
0 and .5.
6 Interaction of ﬁrm policy and ﬁnancing regime
Heterogeneous multiple bank ﬁnancing hence enables ﬁrms to choose a multi-faceted
policy mix. While the degree of heterogeneity does not inﬂuence the ﬁrm’s optimal pol-
icy in the most favorable and the most unfavorable circumstances, it is decisive for the
intermediate cases. In particular for ﬁrms with highly-speciﬁc assets, the bank ﬁnancing
system may help to fully eliminate the probability of ineﬃcient project liquidation in
a case where a low expected project cash-ﬂow exposes the ﬁrm to a signiﬁcant risk of
coordination failure. However, this beneﬁcial eﬀect necessitates the degree of relation-
ship bank ﬁnancing to be limited above, which requires the existence of arm’s-length
banks to ﬁll this ﬁnancing gap. In this case, the hold-up concern, that arises due to the
ﬁrm’s inability to “replace” the relationship lender in a cost-eﬃcient way, turns into
24a hold-up beneﬁt. It takes eﬀect, as the fact that the relationship bank’s proportion
of total ﬁrm debt does not succumb to aggregate uncertainty and can, moreover, be
directly inﬂuenced by the ﬁrm’s policy, outweighs the higher reﬁnancing costs from a
foreclosure of credit by this lender.
Still, the hold-up beneﬁt comes at a cost. Whenever the bank ﬁnancing system is
suﬃciently heterogeneous, i.e. if the degree of relationship banking is limited, ﬁrms
with lowly-speciﬁc assets and moderate expected project cash-ﬂows face a relatively
high probability of ineﬃcient project liquidation unless the expected cash-ﬂow becomes
extremely high. For them, the limited degree of relationship lending does not allow
the optimal ﬁrm policy to fully eliminate the remaining risk of a coordination failure.
Comparing these results to the ones obtained in a model of homogeneous multiple
bank ﬁnancing (Heinemann and Metz, 2002) shows that ﬁrms with lowly-speciﬁc
assets hardly beneﬁt from using both relationship and arm’s-length lending. Rather,
a homogeneous bank ﬁnancing regime allows to fully eliminate the risk of ineﬃcient
liquidation for projects with high expected cash-ﬂows. Firms with highly-speciﬁc assets,
however, may be put at an advantage by using a heterogeneous bank ﬁnancing system.
One further aspect may be raised with regard to the employment of heterogeneous
multiple bank ﬁnancing. It concerns the question who beneﬁts from such a bank ﬁnanc-
ing system. From the analysis above, we know that ﬁrms with highly-speciﬁc assets
proﬁt most, since for them the hold-up beneﬁt is most relevant, while ﬁrms with low
asset speciﬁcity may suﬀer from the remaining risk of coordination failure that cannot
be fully eliminated by the optimal ﬁrm policy. Apart from the ﬁrms themselves, the in-
volved banks proﬁt as well due to an increased probability of credit repayment following
the hold-up beneﬁt. Taking an even broader perspective, we ﬁnd that, eventually, the
hold-up beneﬁt allows ﬁrms to choose low business risk despite low expected project
cash-ﬂows, which would otherwise incite ﬁrms to maximize fundamental uncertainty
by choosing high business risk. In this way, a heterogeneous multiple bank ﬁnancing
system supports economic stability by reducing the ﬁrms’ incentives to conduct highly
risky projects.
257 Conclusion
Our study underlines the subtle eﬀects that bank ﬁnancing may have on a ﬁrm’s opti-
mal risk- and information-policy and, subsequently, on the policy’s eﬃciency. We ﬁnd
that heterogeneous multiple bank ﬁnancing allows multi-faceted ﬁrm decisions. Firms
adjust their optimal risk-taking and information disclosure to the degree of lending
heterogeneity whenever circumstances are not so favorable that the ﬁrm will almost
always be viable nor so unfavorable that the ﬁrm will almost always have to default. In
particular, ﬁrms with highly-speciﬁc assets may beneﬁt, as their optimal policy leads to
a full elimination of ex-ante default probability, provided that the degree of relationship
lending is limited by arm’s-length lending.
One of the main contributions of this paper focuses on the hitherto undetected
ﬂip-side of the hold-up problem that arises once relationship lending is combined with
arm’s-length lending so that the degree of relationship bank ﬁnancing is limited. The
coexistence of both types of banks allows the ﬁrm to make use of the tradeoﬀ between
the relationship bank’s bargaining power due to her informational advantage on the
one hand and the risk of coordination failure among arm’s-length banks on the other
hand. The degree of bank ﬁnancing heterogeneity hence delivers an instrument for the
ﬁrm to credibly signal its commitment to the business project and its willingness to
abstain from strategic default. This allows the optimal ﬁrm policy to fully eliminate
the remaining risk of ineﬃcient credit withdrawal and hence the probability of ﬁrm
default - an eﬀect denoted as “hold-up beneﬁt”, as it relies on the characteristics of the
hold-up problem, albeit weakened by the existence of arm’s-length bank ﬁnancing.
Certainly, the hold-up beneﬁt requires the existence of suﬃciently heterogeneous
types of banks, respectively the willingness and ability of banks to act either as a re-
lationship bank or as an arm’s-length lender to a borrower. The paper may therefore
also contribute to an explanation of the wide variety of - particularly European - com-
mercial banks that often specialize on lending to particular borrowers with regard to,
e.g., industry, size or location.
26Appendix
Appendix A - Derivation of the uniqueness condition
For the equilibrium derived in section 3 to be unique, the indiﬀerence curves of banks
and ﬁrm have to intersect exactly once (necessary and suﬃcient condition). For this to












∂θ∗ denotes the derivative of the ﬁrm’s indiﬀerence condition (i.e. equilibrium
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√
b(x∗
S − θ∗)) a √
b
λ(WR − r)
Since the partial derivatives of the banks’ indiﬀerence curves are constant, the
uniqueness conditions are satisﬁed if they hold for the minimum of the ﬁrm’s indif-
ference curve’s derivative. In order to calculate this minimum, it has to be taken into
account that both standard normal distributions that enter the partial derivative have




























This inequality is satisﬁed provided that the banks’ private information is suﬃciently
precise relative to public information, i.e. b and c are suﬃciently large relative to a.
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Since under the uniqueness condition the denominator is positive, the partial deriva-
tive is positive whenever θ∗ < y − 1/
√




Appendix C - Optimal information disclosure
Case 1: high early liquidation value, K > 1/2 r
When the early liquidation value K is suﬃciently high, threshold function M(c →
∞) converges to y from below. Let us ﬁrst analyze the case of low expected cash-
ﬂow, i.e. y < θc. Since θ∗ is decreasing along with c whenever θ∗ > y−1/
√
a + c Φ−1(K/r),
we ﬁnd that θ∗ decreases in c for the whole range of parameter values. Hence, the ﬁrm
can minimize the probability of ineﬃcient project liquidation by providing the relation-
ship bank with completely precise information, i.e. c∗ → ∞.
If, in contrast, expected cash-ﬂow is high, so that y > θc, the following situation
is obtained (see Fig. 2). For low precision values c, equilibrium value θ∗ will be higher
than threshold function M(·), so that θ∗ is decreasing in c. Once θ∗ equals the threshold,
a minimum is reached and θ∗ starts increasing along with c for higher precision values.
The minimum value of θ∗ is obtained for a precision denoted ˜ c, where the two curves
cross. However, in order to ensure uniqueness of equilibrium, we require c to be at least






cmin if cmin > ˜ c
˜ c if cmin ≤ ˜ c ,
where ˜ c is implicitly deﬁned by θ∗(c) = y − 1/
√







y − 1 √
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Figure 2: K > 1/2 r and y > θc
Case 2: low early liquidation value, K < 1/2 r
For K < 1/2r, threshold M(c → ∞) converges to y from above. If expects cash-
ﬂow is low, so that y < θc, the ﬁrm’s optimal information policy is either to disclose
completely precise information to the relationship bank or to decrease information pre-
cision to its minimally necessary level, as can be seen from Fig. 3.
If a is suﬃciently low, so that cmin takes on very low values, it might be the case that
θ∗(cmin) ≤ θc, so that it is advantageous for the ﬁrm to disclose as imprecise information
as possible. In any other case, however, the ﬁrm can minimize the probability of ineﬃ-
cient project liquidation by granting completely precise information to the relationship
bank.








































Figure 3: K < 1/2 r and y < θc
Hence, for a ≤ ¯ a optimal information precision is given by cmin, whereas for a > ¯ a the
ﬁrm is best oﬀ by providing the relationship bank with completely precise information,
i.e. c∗ → ∞.
If the market holds very optimistic expectations with regard to cash-ﬂow, i.e.
y > θc, the optimal information policy is to choose c∗ = cmin, as the condition for θ∗ to
be increasing in c is always satisﬁed.
Appendix D - Optimal risk-taking
Case 1: high early liquidation value, K > 1/2r
If expected cash-ﬂow is low, i.e. y < θc, we know that the relationship bank
should optimally be provided with completely precise information: c∗ → ∞. Examining
the extreme values of a, i.e. either maximum risk (a = 0) or zero risk (a → ∞), while
taking into account the optimal information policy, the equilibrium values of θ∗ are
30given by20
(A2) θ
∗(c → ∞,a = 0) = V + r +
K
r
[λ(WR − r) + (1 − λ)(WS − r)]
and
(A3) θ
∗(c → ∞,a → ∞) = V + r + λ(WR − r)
K
r
+ (1 − λ)(WS − r) .





(1 − λ)(WS − r)ϕ(·)[ 1 √
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which is positive whenever θ∗(c → ∞,a) > y − 1/(2
√
a + b)Φ−1(K/r). This condition
is satisﬁed, as Φ−1(K/r) > 0 and y < θc. Hence, θ∗ is increasing in a and θ∗ − y > 0,
so that according to (8) the probability of ineﬃcient project termination increases in
a. The optimal business risk is therefore given by maximum risk, i.e. a∗∗ = 0. The
ex-ante probability of ineﬃcient project liquidation, Φ(
√
a(θ∗ − y)), is then reduced to
a level of Φ(0) = 1/2.
If, in contrast, expected cash-ﬂow is high, i.e. y > θc, optimal information
precision is given as either c∗ = cmin or c∗ = ˜ c. Let us ﬁrst concentrate on the case of
c∗ = cmin. Here, the equilibrium value θ∗ for a = 0 is given by
(A5) θ
∗(c
min,a = 0) = V + r +
K
r
[λ(WR − r) + (1 − λ)(WS − r)] = θ
∗(a = 0) .
We know that θc = θ∗(c → ∞,a) < y for all a. Hence, it also holds for a = 0. θ∗(a = 0),
however, is independent of c. Therefore, it must be the case that θ∗(cmin,a = 0) < y as
well.
20Equation (A3) is derived by using the fact that the second term in (3) can also be expressed
as (1 − λ)(WS − r)Φ(a/
√
b(θ∗ − y) +
 
a/b + 1 Φ−1(K/r)) = (1 − λ)(WS − r)Φ(a[1/
√
b(θ∗ − y) +
 
1/ab + 1/a2 Φ−1(K/r)]). Since y < θc holds for all values of a, it has to hold for a → ∞ as well, so
that the latter term converges to (1 − λ)(WS − r)Φ(+∞) = (1 − λ)(WS − r).
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where ϕ1(·) = ϕ(
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b(a + b) + (WS − r)ϕ2(·)
 
a3(2π + a)
≡ ¯ λ ,
threshold (A7) converges to y from above, since the term in brackets is then positive
and Φ−1(K/r) > 0 in the case considered. For λ > ¯ λ, therefore, θ∗(cmin,a) decreases
in a as θ∗(cmin,a = 0) < y. Hence, since θ∗ − y < 0, the optimal value of a is given
by a∗∗ → ∞, so that the probability of ineﬃcient project liquidation is completely
eliminated, i.e. prob(θ ≤ θ∗) = Φ(−∞) = 0.
For λ ≤ ¯ λ, however, threshold (A7) converges to y from below. Here, we have to
distinguish two cases: either θ∗(cmin,a = 0) < y < θ∗(cmin,a → ∞) or θ∗(cmin,a →
∞) < θ∗(cmin,a = 0) < y. In the ﬁrst case we ﬁnd that a∗ = 0 as given in Fig. 4, since
∂θ∗(cmin,a)/∂a > 0. However, θ∗(cmin,a = 0) < y, so that the overall optimal business
risk a∗∗ will take on an intermediate value.
In the second case, i.e. for θ∗(cmin,a → ∞) < θ∗(cmin,a = 0) < y, the optimal value
of business risk is given by a∗∗ → ∞, as can be seen from Fig. 5. Here, θ∗ decreases in a
for suﬃciently high values of a, and θ∗(cmin,a → ∞) < y, so that ∂prob(θ ≤ θ∗)/∂a < 0
and hence projects with zero risk (a∗∗ → ∞) will minimize the probability of ineﬃcient











Figure 4: K > 1/2 r, y > θc, λ ≤ ¯ λ and θ∗(cmin,a = 0) < y < θ∗(cmin,a → ∞)
Whenever optimal information precision is given by ˜ c, we ﬁnd that for the extreme
values of a the equilibrium value θ∗ is given by
(A9) θ
∗(˜ c,a = 0) = V + r +
K
r
[λ(WR − r) + (1 − λ)(WS − r)]
and
(A10) θ
∗(˜ c,a → ∞) = y .













Since θ∗(˜ c,a) ≤ y (see ﬁgure 1), while the partial derivative (∂θ∗(˜ c,a))/(∂a) is positive,
the optimal value of a must be an interior solution. Plugging the partial derivative in


























The value of a that minimizes this probability is then found as the intermediate value













Figure 5: K > 1/2r, y > θc, λ ≤ ¯ λ and θ∗(cmin,a → ∞) < θ∗(cmin,a = 0) < y
Summarizing the diﬀerent results for the case of high liquidation value and high
expected cash-ﬂow, we ﬁnd the following:
• For c∗ = cmin:
– with suﬃciently high λ, optimal business risk is characterized by a∗∗ → ∞, so
that the probability of ineﬃcient project termination amounts to Φ(−∞) =
0, since θ∗ < y.
– with suﬃciently low λ, optimal business risk is either achieved with a∗∗ → ∞
and leads to a probability of ineﬃcient project termination of Φ(−∞) = 0
whenever y is extremely high, i.e. y > θ∗(cmin,a → ∞). Otherwise, optimal
risk takes on an intermediate value.




Hence, for a suﬃciently high degree of relationship banking (i.e. for λ > ¯ λ), optimal
ﬁrm policy is described by c∗ = cmin and a∗∗ → ∞, since, due to the high value of
a, cmin > ˜ c. For a low degree of relationship banking, in contrast, the ﬁrm will either
34choose a policy combination of a∗∗ → ∞ and c∗ = cmin for projects with extremely
high expected cash-ﬂows or select intermediate riskiness and intermediate information
precision otherwise.
Case 2: low early liquidation value, K < 1/2r
For low expected cash-ﬂow and a ≤ ¯ a, optimal information precision is given by
c∗ = cmin, whereas with a > ¯ a, optimal precision is given by c∗ → ∞.
If we ﬁrst concentrate on the case of c∗ = cmin, we know that due to the assumption
of y < θc also θ∗(cmin,a = 0) > y. Again, it holds that θ∗(cmin,a) increases in a
whenever θ∗ is higher than threshold (A7). Since in the current case it is assumed that
K < 1/2r, however, the threshold will converge to y from below for a → ∞ whenever
λ > ¯ λ. It can therefore be shown that for a suﬃciently high degree of relationship
banking θ∗(cmin,a) increases in a and, since θ∗ > y, the overall probability of ineﬃcient
project termination increases in a as well, so that the optimal risk parameter is given
by a∗∗ = 0.
For λ ≤ ¯ λ, however, threshold (A7) converges to y from above. Again, two diﬀerent
possibilities arise. Either θ∗(cmin,a → ∞) < y < θ∗(cmin,a = 0), so that θ∗ decreases in
a. Since for suﬃciently high a equilibrium value θ∗ is lower than y, the probability of
ineﬃcient project liquidation is minimized by selecting a project risk of a∗∗ → ∞. The
overall probability of liquidation is then reduced to a level of Φ(−∞) = 0.21
Alternatively, the case of y < θ∗(cmin,a = 0) < θ∗(cmin,a → ∞) could arise as shown
in Fig. 6. Since in this case equilibrium value θ∗ is always higher than y and a∗ = ˜ a1,
an intermediate value of a will minimize the overall probability of ineﬃcient project
termination but cannot eliminate the risk completely.
For a > ¯ a, in contrast, optimal information precision is given by c∗ → ∞. We know
that θ∗(c → ∞,a) increases in a whenever θ∗ > y − 1/(2
√
a + b) Φ−1(K/r) and vice
21Note that for cmin to be the optimal precision value, risk parameter a is required to be at most as
high as ¯ a, i.e. the value of a that equates θ∗(cmin,a) and θ∗(c → ∞,a) = θc. Since, as it turns out,
the optimal risk parameter is given by a∗∗ → ∞, cmin = a2/(2π) → ∞ as well, so that the condition












Figure 6: K < 1/2 r, y < θc, λ ≤ ¯ λ and y < θ∗(cmin,a = 0) < θ∗(cmin,a → ∞)
versa. For a → ∞, this threshold converges to y from above, since Φ−1(K/r) < 0.
In the only feasible case, y < θ∗(c → ∞,a = 0) < θ∗(c → ∞,a → ∞), so that Fig.
7 is obtained. Again, an intermediate solution for a will be optimal to reduce θ∗.
Since equilibrium value θ∗ is always higher than y, however, choosing a∗∗ → 0 would
be the best policy to minimize the overall probability of ineﬃcient project liquidation
and reduce it to a level of 1/2. However, for c → ∞ to be chosen as optimal precision
in the ﬁrst place, a has to be suﬃciently high, so that this result has to be ruled out.
Summing up the results for this case of low liquidation value and low expected cash-
ﬂow, we ﬁnd the following: Optimal information precision is only given by c∗ = cmin:
• For λ > ¯ λ optimal riskiness is characterized by a∗∗ = 0. The prior probability of
ineﬃcient project termination is thereby reduced to a value of 1/2.
• For λ ≤ ¯ λ, the probability of ineﬃcient project termination can be completely
eliminated by choosing a∗∗ → ∞. Since this is the lowest level that can be
achieved, intermediate values of a do not have to be considered as alternative
solutions.




θ∗(c → ∞,a → ∞)









Figure 7: K < 1/2 r, y < θc, a > ¯ a and y < θ∗(c → ∞,a = 0) < θ∗(c → ∞,a → ∞)
optimal information precision is given by c∗ = cmin. θ∗(cmin,a) increases in a whenever
θ∗ is higher than threshold (A7). For λ > ¯ λ and a → ∞, threshold (A7) converges to
y from below. In the only feasible case of θ∗(cmin,a → ∞) < θ∗(cmin,a = 0) < y, θ∗ is
decreasing in a for suﬃciently high values of a, while at the same time θ∗ < y, so that
the overall optimal value of a is given by a∗∗ → ∞.
For λ ≤ ¯ λ, instead, threshold (A7) converges to y from above. Since θ∗(cmin,a =
0) < y, θ∗ decreases in a and the probability of ineﬃcient project liquidation can be
minimized by selecting minimum business risk: a∗∗ → ∞.
Hence for both low and high values of λ, the probability of ineﬃcient project liquida-
tion can be minimized by conducting a policy with parameters c∗ = cmin and a∗∗ → ∞,
so that Φ(
√
a(θ∗ − y)) = 0.22
22Choosing maximum risk, i.e. a∗∗ = 0, for λ > ¯ λ would reduce the ex-ante probability of project
liquidation to a value of 1/2. A risk policy of a∗∗ → ∞ is therefore more eﬃcient and should be
preferred.
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